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THE SHOW MUST GO ON AS ACADEMIC FREEDOM SAVES
THE DAY: BUT WHERE DOES ACADEMIC FREEDOM END
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BEGIN AND HAS THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT RESTRICTED THE LIMITED PUBLIC
FORUM IN LINNEMEIR v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
PURDUE UNIVERSITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Art and entertainment can take a number of forms; for exam-
ple, artistic expression can be as simple as a mural displayed in the
hallway of a public school.' Additionally, artistic expression can
also be performed on stage such as when choirs perform concerts
for the public. 2 Many times, however, public schools and universi-
ties perform plays that run into significant First Amendment chal-
lenges.3 Such First Amendment challenges can occur when the
artistic expression or performance relates to religion. 4
The United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion."5 This phrase
has been interpreted to prohibit the establishment of a state church
or religion. 6 The Supreme Court has stated that under the First
1. See Gemetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 466 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating student mural part of larger collection of artwork done by extra-
curricular groups).
2. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995)
(discussing choir's singing theme song during performances for public and for
choral competitions).
3. See Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir.
2001) (discussing university's plans to show performance of play entitled Corpus
Christi written by Terrance McNally). The Seventh Circuit spelled the plaintiff Lin-
nemeir, whereas the district court classified the plaintiff as Linnemeier. For the
purposes of this Note, this distinction between the two spellings will remain intact,
as the Seventh Circuit opinion will be classified with the Linnemeir designation
and the district court opinion will be classified with the Linnemeier designation.
4. See Gernetzke, 274 F.3d at 466-67 (discussing plaintiffs contention that
school principal violated their constitutional fights to religious freedom by remov-
ing mural containing cross); Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758 (stating plaintiffs conten-
tion that university violated Establishment Clause by supporting anti-Christian
play); Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 407 (stating plaintiff's contention that
singing religious school theme song at all school events transformed permissible
practice of singing song into actual state endorsement of religion).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (stating purpose of
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause is "to prevent, as far as possible, the
intrusion of either [the church or state] into the precincts of the other" (quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). In Lemon, the Court stated that
(449)
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Amendment a state may not sponsor a program or practice that
disparages any particular religion or belief.7 In determining if a
practice violates the Establishment Clause, courts often look to
whether the program or practice is conducted in either a public or
non-public forum." This determination is significant because pri-
vate expression in the limited or traditional public forum will be
given wider latitude as it relates to any perceived Establishment
Clause violation. 9
the authors of the religion clauses of the First Amendment sought to prohibit the
establishment of a state church or religion because of the great dangers that a state
religion or church would impose on the American people. See 403 U.S. at 612.
7. See Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968). In Epperson, the Court
stated that:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile
to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, fos-
ter, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even
against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates govern-
mental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion.
Id. at 103-04.
8. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
4312, at *15-16 (June 11, 2001) (stating parties stipulated school district created
limited public forum when school opened its facilities to student groups after
school, but also stating if parties had not stipulated this fact, determining type of
forum would have to be resolved); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
303 (2000) (holding "selective access does not change government property into
public forum," and while granting access to one student does not preclude finding
of limited public forum, school election system ensures only majoritarian message
will be put forth); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
770 (1995) (plurality opinion) (stating religious expression of cross on public or
limited public forum if purely private and publicly announced to all on equal
terms cannot violate Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277
(1981) (stating school that created forum, which was generally open to all groups
cannot seek to enforce exclusion based on religious speech).
9. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (stating "Religious expression cannot violate the
Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional
or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.").
It is important to note however, that this per se rule of private speech in the public
forum has only received plurality support on the Supreme Court. See id. at 757.
Instead, the concurring justices in Pinette added the important fact that the state
had included an adequate disclaimer which made clear the state's role in expres-
sion to the community and removed any doubt about any perceived state approval
of the religious message. See id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Pinette, the
state did not endorse the religious expression, and while the expression was made
on government property, it was requested via the same process and on the same
terms as other private groups. See id. at 763; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (stating Christian after-school club is private speech because
secondary school students are mature enough to understand that club resembles
private speech endorsing religion which does not violate the First Amendment as
opposed to government speech endorsing religion which would violate Establish-
ment Clause).
[Vol. 9: p. 449
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Such Establishment Clause issues often arise in the context of
public schools and universities.10 Examples of Establishment
Clause cases in public schools and universities include student-run
religious publications and student-led prayers during graduation
exercises.1 Establishment Clause issues have also arisen in more
traditional classroom settings.' 2 In these types of cases, an addi-
tional concern for academic freedom surfaces. 13 At the same time,
however, courts have held that the classroom is not a public forum
for professors.' 4 Schools and school officials must be aware that
even activities that are seen as possible entertainment or expressive
aspects of the curriculum can violate the Establishment Clause.15
As a result, school policies or programs that rise to an endorsement
10. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
837 (1995) (noting University of Virginia argued funding Christian publication
through mandatory student fees violated Establishment Clause); Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 265 (noting University of Missouri at Kansas City argued it could not allow relig-
ious group to use its facilities any longer because school policy prohibited use of
religious worship or religious teaching based upon perceived violation of Establish-
ment Clause); Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 466-67
(7th Cir. 2001). While the claim in Gernetzkewas a religious freedom claim and not
an Establishment Clause claim, the action was predicated on the principal not
wanting to invite possible Establishment Clause litigation. See Gernetzke, 274 F.3d at
466; see also Martha M. McCarthy, "A Wink and a Nod" to Student-Initiated Devotionals
in Public Schools, 139 EDuc. LAw REP. 1, 15-16 (Jan. 2000) (stating ambiguous defi-
nitions and inconsistent legal standards of Establishment Clause are frustrating to
school personnel who devote time and energy to church/state controversies and
because of ambiguity, litigation will follow).
11. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295 (stating respondents moved for temporary
restraining order to prevent school district from going forward with student-led
prayer at graduation because it violated Establishment Clause); see also Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 837 (stating petitioner's claim that alleged production of Christian
magazine through student activity funds violated Establishment Clause).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1377
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting parent's objection to part of school curriculum that sug-
gested students compose rhymes and chants similar to Wicca religion); Roberts v.
Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047,1055 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The removal of material from the
classroom is acceptable when it is determined that the materials are being used in
a manner that violates the Establishment Clause guarantees."); Grove v. Mead Sch.
Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing student's objection
to reading The Learning Tree because it was offensive to her religious beliefs).
13. SeeFleischfresserv. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating government interest in providing well-rounded education outweighed par-
ent's wishes of their free exercise rights).
14. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating
public university professor does not have First Amendment right to decide what
will be taught in classroom).
15. See McCarthy, supra note 10, at 15 (stating school personnel must devote
substantial time and energy to ensure they act in accordance with principles of
Establishment Clause).
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or disparagement of a particular religion, violate the Establishment
Clause. 16
While courts often look to the public forum doctrine, 17 they
also grant schools and universities wide discretion for academic
freedom, whereby a school may decide its own curriculum and
teaching methods. 18 When a court grants a school the ability to
decide its own curriculum, expressive activities bring about differ-
ing views. 19 These types of expressive activities might be prevented,
however, if school officials do not allow students their free speech
rights.
2 0
In Linnemeir v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University,2' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
whether a state university violated the Establishment Clause by pro-
ducing a play, Corpus Christi, which depicts Jesus Christ as a homo-
sexual engaging in homoerotic acts with his disciples.22 The
16. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (holding school district's policy of allowing
student to give prayer at home football games violated Establishment Clause); Ep-
person v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (holding state practice only allowing
teachers to teach creationism and prohibiting them from teaching evolutionism
violated Establishment Clause because it acted as aid to Christian religion); Doe v.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1995) (looking at whether
using religious theme song will have affect of advancing or endorsing religion).
17. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304 (holding mere election system of student
prayer speaker does not create limited public forum, and therefore, prayer during
home football game takes place in non-public forum and violates Establishment
Clause); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990) (stating school created
limited public forum and therefore could not prohibit noncurriculum related stu-
dent groups from equal access to school facilities on basis of that group's speech);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding because university created
public forum, it could not exclude religious group on basis of group's religious
speech).
18. See Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that if Establishment Clause violation arose whenever "student
believed that a school practice either advanced or disapproved of a religion, school
curricula would be reduced to lowest common denominator" and would make stu-
dents ultimate curriculum review committee unto themselves); Roberts v. Madi-
gan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055 ("[S]chool officials must be allowed, within certain
bounds, to exercise discretion in determining what materials or classroom prac-
tices are being used appropriately."); Grove, 753 F.2d at 1533 ("Local school boards
have broad discretion in the management of schools.").
19. See Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir.
2001) (stating First Amendment supports school role in fostering expression of
views that are antagonistic to majoritarian Christian viewpoint).
20. See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Religious Expression and Teacher
Control of the Classroom: A New Battleground for Free Speech, 107 EDUC. LAw REP. 1, 14
(Apr. 18, 1996) (stating while "free speech has expanded students' expressive
rights, the role of expression in the classroom" has not been decided and courts
must balance need for school officials to direct learning).
21. 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001).
22. See id. at 758 (stating plaintiffs argue presenting play will violate First
Amendment because school will be sponsoring anti-Christian beliefs).
[Vol. 9: p. 449
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Seventh Circuit held that the theater where the play was to be per-
formed was like a classroom, and therefore was a non-public fo-
rum.23 The court decided the case under the theory of academic
freedom and gave the university discretion in determining whether
to perform the play. 24 The court stated that under the theory of
academic freedom, the government had a strong interest in provid-
ing a stimulating, well-rounded education and this mission would
be crippled if the court did not permit the performance.
25
This Note examines the holding and rationale the Seventh Cir-
cuit used to determine whether the university theater was a non-
public forum, and why the court decided the case under an aca-
demic freedom argument. Part II of this Note details the facts of
Linnemeir.26 Part III provides an overview of the anti-religious seg-
ment of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the public forum doc-
trine and Establishment Clause issues that have arisen in artistic
expression and entertainment related activities in the public
schools. 27 Part IV of this Note explains the Seventh Circuit's ratio-
nale for its holding and Judge Coffey's reasons for his dissent.28
Part V analyzes the court's reasoning as it pertains to prior author-
ity. 29 Finally, Part VI examines the impact that this decision will
have on future Establishment Clause cases, and will briefly examine
the impact on future artistic expression and entertainment activi-
ties that take place in the public school setting.30
II. FACTS
Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne is a state-
run institution of higher learning.3 1 Jonathan Gilbert was a theater
major at the university with an emphasis on directing, and was en-
rolled in a course entitled "Senior Performance Project."32 In or-
23. See id. at 760 (holding "[c]lassrooms are not public forums").
24. See id. ("the school authorities and the teachers, not the courts, [should]
decide whether classroom instruction shall include works by blasphemers").
25. See id. at 759 (stating if court ruled in favor of preliminary injunction,
other scholarly works would be prohibited from being taught at public
universities).
26. For a further discussion of the underlying facts of the case, see infra notes
31-45.
27. For a further discussion of the background, see infra notes 46-140.
28. For a further discussion of the narrative analysis, see infra notes 141-61.
29. For a further discussion of the critical analysis, see infra notes 162-91.
30. For a further discussion of the impact this case will have on artistic and
entertainment related school activities, see infra notes 192-210.
31. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758.
32. See Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Fort Wayne, ("Linnemeier II"),
155 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1036 (N.D. Ind. 2001), stay denied sub nom., Linnemeir v. Bd.
5
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der to fulfill his course requirements, Gilbert directed a play of his
choosing, Terrance McNally's Corpus Christi.33 The play portrays
Joshua, a Jesus Christ figure, as the protagonist who is a homosex-
ual engaging in sexual relations with his disciples. 34
Before the play could be performed, Gilbert's selection had to
be approved by a five-member faculty review board.35 This five-
member board never evaluated the viewpoint of any proposed pro-
duction.3 6 Rather, the board only "inquire[d] of the student the
reasons for selecting a particular project and how that student is
prepared to undertake that project."3 7 The play was to be per-
formed at the studio theater on the Indiana University-Purdue Uni-
versity at Fort Wayne campus.3 8
Initially, eleven residents of the state of Indiana and twenty-one
members of the Indiana General Assembly filed suit, alleging the
university and its Board of Trustees would violate the Establishment
of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 760 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing course was re-
quirement for all theater majors and that course was to serve "as the curricular
capstone, during [the student's] final semester"). The course catalog explained
that " [ s] tudents will develop, with their advisor, a public performance or presenta-
tion appropriate to their area of emphasis." Linnemeier II, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
Furthermore, the theater department placed an emphasis on the need for its ma-
jor students to obtain both classroom study and theater production experience as a
way of "educat[ing] its students in the art, craft and discipline of the theater." Id.
n.3.
33. See Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Fort Wayne, ("Linnemeier I")
155 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 2001), injunction denied, Linnemeier v.
Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Fort Wayne, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Ind. 2001),
stay denied sub nom., Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating Gilbert's major and concentration and his ultimate decision to
direct Corpus Christi with permission of university's faculty).
34. See Linnemeier I, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (stating theme of play). The play
itself contains graphic language at times. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758. For in-
stance, while the Jesus Christ like character is hanging on the cross, one of his
disciples shouts to him, "Hey faggot! If I was the Son of God I wouldn't be hang-
ing here with my dick between my legs." Id.
35. See Linnemeierl1, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (stating Gilbert submitted propo-
sal sheet to five member faculty committee for approval).
36. See id. at 1036-37 (stating theater department chair testified theater de-
partment never evaluated viewpoint of work proposed as part of course require-
ment and remains viewpoint neutral as to all theater productions).
37. Id. at 1036.
38. See id. at 1036 (stating where production was to take place). The univer-
sity argued that the studio theater was not only available to university students or
students who are theater majors at the school. See id. at 1037. Indiana University-
Purdue University argued that it permitted outside groups to use the theater's fa-
cilities, but to date, only one outside group had taken the opportunity to use the
studio theater. See id. Larry Life, the chairperson of the theater department, and
the school's chancellor, both agreed that the studio theater was available and open
to outside groups without regard to the content of the outside group's speech. See
id.
[Vol. 9: p. 449
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Clause if the production was performed at the studio theater. 9
Eventually, all but three plaintiffs were dismissed as lacking stand-
ing.40 The three remaining plaintiffs petitioned the Northern Dis-
trict Court for the State of Indiana for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the play from being performed. 41 After the district court
denied the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs filed an appeal
with the Seventh Circuit seeking a stay pending their appeal from
the district court's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction. 42
The district court held that the studio theater was a limited
public forum and that the university could not discriminate against
the viewpoint of those speaking without violating the First Amend-
ment's free speech guarantee. 43 While the Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's finding, it agreed with the ultimate
holding and allowed the play to go forward. 44 The Seventh Circuit
held that it should be up to the university and not the courts to
decide "whether classroom instruction [should] include works by
blasphemers." 4 5
39. See Linnemeier , 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48 (setting forth various parties in
litigation). In this original opinion by the district court, the judge dismissed all but
three of the plaintiffs who were residents of Indiana because the rest of the plain-
tiffs did not have standing. See id. at 1055.
40. See id. at 1055 (stating motion to dismiss is denied as to three plaintiffs).
41. See Linnemeier 11, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36 (setting forth remaining three
plaintiffs' motion to enjoin university from putting on production of Corpus
Christi).
42. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758 (discussing plaintiffs' motion to stay pend-
ing appeal of district court's refusal to grant preliminary injunction).
43. See Linnemeier 11, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1042-43 (stating university created
public forum at studio theater and could not discriminate against viewpoint of
those speaking).
44. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (denying motion to stay and therefore al-
lowing play to go forward).
45. Id. (holding courts should not decide whether production should go on,
rather decision should be left to school officials). Thejudges agreed that the thea-
ter was not a limited public or traditional public forum as the district judge had
ruled, but rather that the theater was a non-public forum. See id. "But the jurists
parted ways after that." Patricia Manson, Curtain Rising for Play Judges Deem Offen-
sive, 147 CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 10, 2001, at 1. The Seventh Circuit stated that
the district court opinion focused on whether the university theater was a limited
public forum or a non-public forum. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759-60. The district
court found that the university theater was a limited public forum and that the play
did not violate the Establishment Clause. See Linnemeier II, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1040-
41. It is interesting to note that the district judge felt that if the theater was found
to be a non-public forum, the court was required to undergo a Lemon analysis to
see if in fact the school violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1040.
7
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III. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. '46 This guarantee is often an issue in
public school and university settings. 47 Issues have arisen in the
context of (1) an individual school curriculum;48 (2) school clubs
that are for entertainment or extracurricular activities; 49 and (3)
expressive and overt entertainment activities such as the production
of a play, concert, or artwork.50 In school curriculum cases, the
46. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
47. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
4312 at *38 (June 11, 2001) (holding permitting Christian club to meet in public
school facilities after school hours would not violate Establishment Clause); Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding prayer on school PA
system at home football games violated Establishment Clause because it estab-
lished improper perception of encouraging prayer delivery at important school
events); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770
(1995) (plurality opinion) (stating religious expression cannot violate Establish-
ment Clause where it "is purely private [and] occurs in traditional or designated
public forum [that is] publicly announced and open to all on equal terms"); Bd.
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (finding that allowing students to
form Christian club at public school did not violate Establishment Clause because
of crucial difference of government endorsing religion and private speech endors-
ing religion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) ("[T]he campus of
a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of
a public forum."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (holding both
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes, which provided financial support for re-
imbursement of non-public school teacher's costs and expenses, were
unconstitutional).
48. See Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1376-77
(9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs objected to use of "Impressions" reading curriculum be-
cause it endorsed and promoted practice of witchcraft). The Impressions series is a
teaching aid that attempts to get children enthusiastic about reading as well as get
children to read faster. See id. at 1377; see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354,
753 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs objected to use of The Learning Tree
in curriculum because it was offensive to student's Christian beliefs). The Learning
Tree was assigned to a sophomore high school student as part of a literature class.
See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1531. The plaintiff in Grove, alleged that by not prohibiting
the book from its curriculum, the school board violated the First Amendment re-
ligion clauses. See id. at 1533.
49. See Good News Club, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4312, at *26-27 (June 11, 2001) (dis-
cussing school district's allegation that exclusion of Christian after-school club was
acceptable because school had compelling interest not to violate Establishment
Clause); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
825-26 (1995) (stating student-run publication's purpose was to "facilitate discus-
sion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian
viewpoints").
50. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758 (stating plaintiffs moved for preliminary in-
junction to stop performance of play because school violated First Amendment by
publicly endorsing anti-Christian beliefs). For a further discussion of school re-
lated artistic and entertainment related school cases, see supra note 4 and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. 9: p. 449
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question is whether the classroom instruction itself violates the Es-
tablishment Clause.5 1 In determining whether violation has oc-
curred, courts often focus on whether the area in question, usually
a classroom, hallway or school theater, is a public or non-public
forum.5 2 Making such a determination is important because a "re-
ligious" message that is purely private and that occurs in a public
forum will not be viewed as a violation of the Establishment Clause
so long as the state adequately makes clear the state's role in the
message. 53
A. Government's Sponsorship of Anti-Religious Speech May
Violate the Establishment Clause
The language of the Establishment Clause makes clear that if
the government endorses a particular religion, that endorsement
violates the Constitution.54 Moreover, courts have stated that state-
51. See Brown, 27 F.3d at 1381 (holding school curriculum which suggests chil-
dren compose rhymes and chants similar to Wicca religion does not violate Estab-
lishment Clause because they constitute minute part of the curriculum, and that
objective observer would not view materials as religious rituals endorsing witch-
craft); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055-56 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating school
decision to prohibit public school teacher from reading Bible quietly during class's
quiet reading period was not government disapproving of Christianity, but rather
school exercising its discretion in determining what materials or classroom prac-
tices are appropriate); Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534 (holding instruction of novel The
Learning Tree did not violate Establishment Clause because it was a comment on
American subculture). While these cases all took place in the typical classroom
setting, they are particularly important in contrasting how the Seventh Circuit in
Linnemeir found that the studio theater, where Corpus Christi was to be performed,
resembled a classroom. See 260 F.3d at 759.
52. For a discussion of the importance of distinguishing between a public and
non-public forum in Establishment Clause litigation, see infra notes 82-116 and
accompanying text. See also Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679,
684 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting school's contention that hallway represented limited
public forum and portrait of Jesus did not violate Establishment Clause).
53. For a discussion of how the state can successfully argue against Establish-
ment Clause violations in public forums see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
It is important to note thatJustice Scalia has received only plurality support for his
per se rule that purely private speech in a public forum that is open to all will not
violate the Establishment Clause. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (plurality opinion). Rather, the concurringjus-
tices in Pinette focused on whether the state action would be perceived as a state
endorsement of religion; yet, they ultimately came to same conclusion of the ma-
jority. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting per se rule
but stating that disclaimer removes "doubt about state approval of ... religious
message").
54. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) ("School
sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary
message to members of the audience who are non-adherents 'that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity.'"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) (stating that "re-
9
Whelan: The Show Must Go on as Academic Freedom Saves the Day: But Where
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
458 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENr. LAw JOURNAL
sponsored programs or practices that are anti-religious in nature
will also violate the Establishment Clause.55
In Grove v. Mead School District No. 354,56 a sophomore in a pub-
lic high school was assigned to read The Learning Tree.57 The stu-
dent felt the book was offensive to her Christian beliefs because it
disparaged her Christian faith.58 The court looked to the three-
prong Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,59 to
determine whether including the novel in the curriculum was
unconstitutional. 60
In Lemon, the Court developed a three-prong test to evaluate
whether the state actually violated the Establishment Clause. 61 The
test required that (1) the state action have a secular legislative pur-
pose, (2) the primary effect of the action neither advance nor in-
hibit religion, and (3) the state action may not "foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion."62 In Lemon, however, the
Court noted that total separation of church and state is not possi-
ble, but by providing this three-part test, it attempted to draw lines
gardless of history, government may not demonstrate a preference for a particular
faith"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (stating authors of Religion
Clauses "did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state
religion, an area history shows they regarded as very important and fraught with
great dangers. Instead they commanded that there should be 'no law respecting an
establishment of religion.'").
55. See Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (stating
government practice cannot advance nor inhibit religion or its practices); Epper-
son v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (holding state may not adopt programs or
practices that oppose any religion); Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534 (ruling that for chal-
lenged state action to pass constitutional muster, it must have secular purpose that
does not advance or inhibit religion nor foster excessive state entanglement with
religion).
56. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. See id. at 1531 (stating student assigned book as part of enrollment in
literature class).
58. See id. (expressing parent and student's objection to book alleging it vio-
lated religion clauses of the First Amendment).
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
60. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534 (holding "to pass constitutional muster, [a]
challenged state action (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3) must not foster excessive
state entanglement with religion"); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating proper inquiry under Lemon is
"whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion").
61. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971) (setting out three-prong Establish-
ment Clause inquiry).
62. See id.; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 697 (1970) (indicating
statute must not foster "an excessive entanglement with religion").
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to guide proper judicial interpretation.63 While in Grove, the court
used the Lemon test, courts "have evaluated state action challenged
on Establishment Clause grounds" under three complementary and
sometimes overlapping tests. 64 The first test is the Lemon three-
prong approach. 65 Second, the endorsement test asks whether the
government endorsed religion by its action. 66 Third, the coercion
test asks whether the government "coerced anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise."67 Using this test, a "school-
sponsored activity [will] contravene the First Amendment when
'(1) the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in
such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors."68 Courts
have stated that "[t] he decision to apply a particular Establishment
Clause test rests upon the nature of the Establishment Clause viola-
tion asserted. '69
In Grove, the court found that the school district did not violate
the Establishment Clause by including The Learning Tree in a minor
part of the school curriculum.70 Furthermore, the court stated that
no violation of the Establishment Clause occurred because of the
absence of student coercion and the critical threat posed to public
education if the book were prohibited.71
The Ninth Circuit elaborated on whether an anti-religious mes-
sage violated the Establishment Clause in Brown v. Woodland Joint
Unified School District.72 In Brown, the court ruled on whether in-
63. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15 ("[T]otal separation is not possible in an
absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organiza-
tions is inevitable.").
64. Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.
1999).
65. See id. (stating that Lemon test is test with longest lineage).
66. See id. ("[The] government unconstitutionally endorses a religion when it
conveys a message that religion is favored, preferred or promoted over other be-
liefs"') (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989)).
67. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
68. Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343 (quotingJones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977
F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992)).
69. Id. at 344. See id. (electing to use coercion test where state action does not
direct participation in religious exercise); but see Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch.
Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 1995) (setting out three Supreme Court Establish-
ment Clause tests but using endorsement test to determine issue).
70. See Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534 (stating The Learning Tree not establishment of
religion or anti-religion but part of collection of "religiously neutral books in a
review of English literature, as a comment on American subculture").
71. See id. at 1533-34 (suggesting "state interest in providing well-rounded
public education would be critically impeded by accommodation of Grove's
wishes").
72. 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). The issue in Brown focused on whether the
school district's inclusion of the Impressions learning series, which is composed of
11
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cluding chants and rhymes similar to the Wicca religion in the
school curriculum violated the Establishment Clause.73 The Ninth
Circuit held that including the chants and rhymes did not violate
the Establishment Clause.7 4 The court reasoned that when a gov-
ernment practice impermissibly disapproves of a religion, it is likely
to be perceived as a state disapproval of an individual religious
choice. 75 The Ninth Circuit again looked to the Lemon test in its
analysis and found that there would be no perceived infringement
on other faiths. 76 Ultimately, the Brown court came to the same
conclusion as the court in Grove, namely, the court found that the
alleged infringement of the Establishment Clause had not
occurred. 77
In Roberts v. Madigan,78 the Tenth Circuit faced a similar ques-
tion and also agreed that school officials must carry out their duties
in a way that does not disparage a particular religion.79 Once again,
the court used the Lemon test to ultimately determine that the
children composing rhymes and chants similar to that of the Wicca religion, pro-
moted the practice of witchcraft in violation of the Establishment Clause. See id. at
1377. In ruling that an objective observer would not see the inclusion of the
rhymes and chants as religious rituals, the court also stated that to do so would
severely hamper the ability of a school to decide for itself the proper school curric-
ula. See id. at 1381.
73. See id. at 1376 (stating issue as whether classroom activities in public
school setting required children to practice witchcraft in violation of Establish-
ment Clause).
74. See id. at 1384 (concluding school district's inclusion of Impressions series
did not violate Establishment Clause).
75. See id. at 1378 ("A government practice has the effect of impermissibly
advancing or disapproving of religion if it is 'sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-
adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.'").
76. See id. at 1381 (stating objective observer in position of young student
would not view them as endorsement of Wicca).
77. See Brown, 27 F.3d at 1385 (holding plaintiffs did not raise genuine issue
of material fact indicating violation of Establishment Clause).
78. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
79. See id. at 1054 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating school officials must carry out
their duties "in a way that neither endorses nor disparages a particular religion or
religion in general"). The Roberts court had to decide whether a teacher who reads
his Bible quietly in his classroom during silent reading period at his desk violated
the Establishment Clause. See id. at 1049. In holding that the school district acted
correctly by disallowing the school teacher from reading his Bible silently during
class time, the Roberts court reasoned that school officials must be allowed to exer-
cise discretion in determining what materials or classroom practices are appropri-
ate. See id. at 1055. In so ruling, the circuit court dismissed the teacher's claim
that the school was disapproving towards the Christian religion. See id. at 1055.
The Tenth Circuit went as far as to say that the school district was forced to act
because the Establishment Clause required such action. See id. at 1050. In effect,
the court reasoned that the professor was actually teaching his religion by silently
reading his book during silent reading period. See id.
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school district had not disapproved of the Christian religion. 0 Fi-
nally, even the Supreme Court has indicated that a state practice
opposing a particular religion or its doctrine will violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.81 Consequently, courts have taken the view that as
long as the state is neutral towards religion, it has not violated the
Establishment Clause.8 2
B. Public Forum Doctrine
While courts state that an anti-religious message can violate the
Establishment Clause, they also distinguish between government
speech endorsing a religious message and purely private speech en-
dorsing a particular religious message.8 3 This distinction is particu-
larly important in artistic and entertainment-related school
activities, where a school may argue the activity is merely private
speech rather than a religious policy or practice endorsed by the
school.84 Courts often utilize the public forum doctrine to distin-
80. See id. at 1053-54 (noting state action must meet all three prongs of Lemon
test to pass constitutionality under Establishment Clause). The Roberts court
pointed out that the first two prongs of the Lemon test require the government to
be neutral with respect to religion. See id. at 1053-54.
81. See Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) ("[T]he State may not
adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges which 'aid or oppose'
any religion.").
82. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (stating pre-
eminent goal of First Amendment to promote governmental neutrality towards
religion). But see Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505, 556-57 (1998) (stating neutrality towards religion ac-
tually follows course that is pro-religion because it "is in line with the interests of
adherents of mainstream religions" while minority religions are pushed aside).
83. See e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). The Mergens
court noted:
[T] here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing re-
ligion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endors-
ing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.
We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are
likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Id. (emphasis added); see also, Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme
Court's Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Ex-
pression, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 681, 682 (2001) (stating if religious activity is attributable
to government it is unconstitutional, but if attributable to private parties, "any at-
tempt to censor or discriminate against private religious activity would . . . raise
serious questions under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses").
84. See e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 4312, at *10-11 (2001) (stating after school club's activities ranged from
singing songs to playing games involving learning Bible verses); Washegesic v.
Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating Jesus Christ
portrait in school hallway violated Establishment Clause because hallway was not
limited public forum and school could not properly separate itself from any per-
ceived endorsement of Christianity). In Good News Club, the Supreme Court held
13
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guish whether speech is private speech or a government endorse-
ment of a religious or anti-religious message.8 5 The public forum
doctrine, therefore, seeks to establish general access and indiscrimi-
nate use to foster a marketplace of ideas, while "eliminating.. . the
fears of government endorsement of religion in Establishment
Clause cases. ' '8 6 Courts have established three separate possible fo-
rums: (1) the traditional public forum, (2) the limited public fo-
rum and (3) the non-public forum.87  The majority of the
Establishment Clause litigation surrounding the public forum doc-
trine focuses on whether the state has created a limited public fo-
rum or a non-public forum.88 The significance lies in the
arguments available to the state; if the state can successfully argue
that the forum is a traditional or limited public forum, courts are
less likely to believe the state is the actual speaker, and therefore,
are likely to rule that the state did not violate the Establishment
Clause.8 9 Consequently, the public forum doctrine is critical in Es-
that the school had created a limited public forum and that excluding the club on
the basis of its religious viewpoint would amount to viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment. See Good News Club, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4312, at
*19.
85. See e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (noting difference between private speech
that does not violate Establishment Clause and government speech that does vio-
late Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding
school's exclusionary policy in public forum violated Constitution); see also Richard
J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where Should the Establishment Wall
Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment Clause Theory: Accommodation, State Action,
the Public Forum, and Private Religious Speech, 8 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1998) (stating courts have used public forum doctrine to determine when private
individual has right to express a religious opinion in fora created by government).
86. Jonathan Frels, Simplifying Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Student-Se-
lected Prayer Cases Through the Use of Public Forum Principles, 20 REv. LrrIc. 233, 270
(Winter 2000) (establishing goals and reasons for court to follow public forum
analysis in Establishment Clause cases).
87. See e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803
(1985) (noting "a university campus, at least as to its students, possesses many of
the characteristics of a traditional public forum"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (setting out three types of possible
fora).
88. See Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1992) (deciding whether
high school commencement was limited public forum or non-public forum).
89. See e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
770 (1995) (plurality opinion) ("Religious expression cannot violate the Establish-
ment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or desig-
nated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms."); see also
id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating presence of disclaimer also impor-
tant in deciding whether state actually endorsed religious message and also dis-
claimer helped to remove doubt of state endorsement); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277
(noting when university created forum open to other student groups, it could not
enforce content-based exclusion based on religious speech because it violated con-
tent-neutral speech regulation).
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tablishment Clause cases to determine whether artistic expression
and entertainment related activities with religious overtones vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. 90 Initially, courts must examine
what constitutes public and limited forums because this determina-
tion characterizes the Establishment Clause issue. 91
1. Public and Limited Public Forums
While public parks and streets are both traditional public fo-
rums, limited public forums are much less defined.92 Limited pub-
lic forums are created "by government designation of a place or
channel of communication for use by the public at large for assem-
bly and speech, for use by certain speakers or for the discussion of
certain subjects."93 Some places in which courts have indicated the
existence of limited public forums include "municipal theaters"94
or public school facilities open to student clubs for expressive activ-
ity pursuits. 95 The establishment of a public or limited public fo-
90. See e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000) (ex-
plaining granting one student access to stage to say prayer does not "necessarily
preclude a finding that a school has created a limited public forum"); Mergens, 496
U.S. at 250 (holding after-school Christian club meetings were held in limited pub-
lic forum because other student groups given same access); Widmar, 454 U.S. at
277 (holding university could not exclude groups on basis of content of their
speech because it had opened up facilities to other student groups); see also Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4312 at *15, 26
(June 11, 2001) (deciding school rooms for use by after school clubs were limited
public fora and deciding whether school violated Establishment Clause by having
group use its facilities).
91. See Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educator's Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983) (indicating state may only exclude in public forum based on compelling
governmental interest). Because a state can only regulate in the public forum
based upon a compelling state interest, it becomes important to see what type of
forum an area is because the state has greater restriction powers to exclude the
speech if it is not by tradition or designation a public forum. See id.
92. See e.g., Brody, 957 F.2d at 1117 (noting streets and parks are public forums
and state can only enforce time, place and manner restrictions or content-based
restrictions that are necessary to serve compelling state purpose and that limited
public forums are created when state deliberately opens up area to public); Doe v.
Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1478 (7th Cir. 1990) (deciding public park is
public forum); Frels, supra note 86, at 243 (suggesting limited public forum harder
to define than traditional public forum because court needs to examine govern-
mental intent and extent of use granted to public to create limited public forum).
93. Cornelius v. NAACP Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
(noting additional public forum may be created by government designation).
94. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)
(stating municipal theaters are "public forums designed for and dedicated to ex-
pressive activities").
95. See Good News Club 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4312, at *15-16 (holding determina-
tion whether state excluded private speaker unconstitutionally depends on nature
of that forum). In Good News Club, the after-school facilities represented a limited
public forum. See id. at *16. The students wished to form a Christian club at the
15
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rum is significant in Establishment Clause litigation because
religious expression will be given greater latitude in either a tradi-
tional or limited public forum when it "is purely private and ...
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms."96 The type of
forum is frequently determined by governmental intent plus the ex-
tent of the use of the area at issue. 97 "The government does not
create a [limited] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum
for public discourse." 98
The Supreme Court decided an Establishment Clause issue in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.99 In Pinette, the
Court scrutinized whether the state violated the Establishment
Clause by erecting a private cross in a public forum adjacent to state
government offices. 10 0 In ruling the cross was constitutional, the
Supreme Court stated that the religious expression the cross repre-
sented was purely private expression in a public forum and a plural-
ity adopted a per se rule stating that private religious expression in a
public forum that is open to all will not violate the Establishment
Clause.101 The plurality noted that if the state was concerned about
possible public misconceptions regarding state endorsement, it
could require all displays to be identified in the square as pure pri-
public school, but the school denied the request. See id. at *10. The Court held
that the school had formed a limited public forum because the school opened up
its facilities to other student groups. See id. at *39. Therefore, the Court held that
the school could not deny the Christian club equal access to the school facilities on
the basis of their content. See id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (stating school
could not enforce content-based exclusion of religious speech without violating
First Amendment freedom of speech provisions because forum was open to all
student groups).
96. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770
(1995) (plurality opinion). Again, this rule has received only the support of four
Supreme Court justices, but in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that a
sign disclaiming state sponsorship or endorsement of the religious message in the
public forum will help to satisfy the endorsement test of the Establishment Clause.
See id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also McConnell, supra note 83, at 682
(stating determination of public sphere is important because religion "need not be
private in its expression or effects" because public sphere need only be neutral and
pluralistic, not necessarily secular) (emphasis added).
97. For a discussion of instances where courts have found limited public fo-
rums as well as instances where courts have found non-public forums, see supra
note 90 and accompanying text.
98. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759
F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining occasional use by outsiders is not enough
to establish public forum).
99. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
100. See id. at 757 (setting forth issue decided in litigation).
101. See id. at 770 (plurality opinion) (holding cross sponsored by private
group is purely private and does not violate Establishment Clause).
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vate displays of expression; the concurring justices looked to the
sign erected next to the cross disclaiming any state endorsement as
helpful in overcoming the endorsement test.102
While Pinette allowed a private group to display a cross in a
traditional public forum, courts generally take a much narrower
view when a religious service is performed in a public forum. 10 3 In
Doe v. Village of Crestwood,x04 the Seventh Circuit ruled a religious
service held under governmental auspices conveyed a message of
approval or endorsement of religion. 105 In Village of Crestwood, how-
ever, the Establishment Clause question focused on the act of per-
forming an actual religious service. 10 6 In this case, the Seventh
Circuit stressed that while the act was to be conducted in a public
forum, it was done so under governmental auspices, making the
service itself a violation of the Establishment Clause. 107 The Sev-
enth Circuit ruled that "[a] government may not close its public
forums to religious practice by private parties.' ' 08
2. Non-Public Forums
When courts look at school Establishment Clause cases in a
non-public forum, they are more likely to find a constitutional viola-
tion because the state cannot allege purely private speech.10 9 In
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,"l0 the Supreme Court
102. See id. at 769 ("If Ohio is concerned about misperceptions, nothing pre-
vents it from requiring all private displays in the square to be identified as such
[and] [t]hat would be a content-neutral 'manner' restriction that is assuredly con-
stitutional."); see also id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating disclaimer helps
to remove doubt as to state endorsement of private cross).
103. See Doe v. Vill. of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1478 (7th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing religious service that was part of larger Italian festival conveyed message of
endorsement by state in violation of Establishment Clause).
104. 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990).
105. See id. at 1478 ("A religious service under governmental auspices necessa-
rily conveys the message of approval or endorsement [and] [p]revailing doctrine
condemns such endorsement, even when no private party is taxed or coerced in
any way.").
106. See id. at 1477 (stating Village of Crestwood was sponsoring Italian festi-
val where mass was to be celebrated in public park).
107. See id. at 1478. But see id. at 1484 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating majority
erred by "focusing exclusively on nature of mass... rather than on how the authentic
Italian mass relates to the expression of traditional Italian culture surrounding the
mass").
108. Vill. of Crestwood, 917 F.2d at 1478.
109. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (stating
because high school home football games took place in non-public forum and
degree of school involvement in pre-game prayer was extensive, Establishment
Clause was violated because it "put school-age children who objected in an untena-
ble position").
110. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
17
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ruled that a student run prayer at football games violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.' 1 ' In Santa Fe, the Court determined the school
did not intend to open the pre-game prayer ceremony to indiscrim-
inate use by the student body. 1 2 Even though the school held an
election to decide who would say the prayer, the Court determined
the school failed to create a limited public forum by guaranteeing
that certain voices and religions would not be the ones saying the
prayer."13 The Court stressed that the degree of school involve-
ment in the prayer process made it clear that the pre-game prayers
bared the imprint of the state and put the school age children who
opposed the prayers in an untenable position. 114 In non-public fo-
rums containing substantial school involvement, therefore, courts
are likely to find the school violated the Establishment Clause.1 15
While Santa Fe was concerned with an Establishment Clause issue
arising at a high school football game, issues often arise in the class-
room where both the anti-religious segment of the Establishment
Clause and the public forum doctrine play a central role. 1 6
C. Religion and the Arts in Public School Settings and
the Classroom
Establishment Clause issues in public schools are not restricted
to school prayer; many Establishment Clause cases touch upon en-
tertainment related activities that are both in the school curricula
and being conducted on school grounds. 11 7 In Doe v. Duncanville
111. See id. at 317 (stating school prayer policy has purpose of and encourages
delivery of prayer at additional important school events).
112. See id. at 303 ("The Santa Fe school officials simply do not 'evince either
by policy or by practice,' any intent to open the pre-game ceremony to 'indiscrimi-
nate use' . . . by the student body generally.").
113. See id. at 304 (stating election system to decide who says pre-game prayers
ensures delivery of only those messages deemed appropriate or majoritarian by
school district policy).
114. See id. at 305.
115. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 (stating relevant question in cases involving
state participation in religious activity is whether objective observer would perceive
government action as state endorsement of prayer in public schools).
116. For background material on anti-religious speech and the Establishment
Clause, see supra notes 54-81 and accompanying text.
117. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1995)
(examining whether singing of religious theme song at public school choir con-
certs and performances violates Establishment Clause). While the Duncanville
court was concerned with a school choir allegedly violating the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court in Good News Club examined whether a club engaging
in the entertainment related activities of singing songs and engaging in entertain-
ing games to help learn Bible verses violated the Establishment Clause. See Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4312 at *26 (June
11, 2001).
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Independent School Distict,11 for example, the Fifth Circuit examined
whether a choir's religious theme song performed at concerts vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.119 The student who brought the
action received academic credit for her participation in the
choir.120 The school choir in Duncanville provided entertainment
for the community, and was also part of the school curriculum.1 21
In deciding that the choir's religious theme song did not violate the
Establishment Clause, the court held that the song did not advance
or endorse religion. 122 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit strayed away
from both the Lemon and coercive test, and instead used Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test to determine any possible Establish-
ment Clause violations. 123
In Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools,' 24 the Sixth Circuit
decided whether a copy of a famous portrait of Jesus Christ dis-
played as artwork in a public school hallway violated the Establish-
ment Clause.1 25 The Sixth Circuit held that the portrait ofJesus did
not satisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, leading the court to
order removal of the portrait.126 The concurring judge in
Washegesic felt constrained by the Lemon analysis and, though agree-
ing with the majority, felt as if the ruling trivialized the
Constitution.1 27
118. 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
119. See id. at 407 (examining whether theme song of choir containing relig-
ious content violated Establishment Clause).
120. See id. (indicating participation was required to receive academic credit).
121. See id. (stating members of choir receive academic credit for their parti-
cipation).
122. See id. ("Neither does utilizing The Lord Bless You and Keep You as a theme
song advance or endorse religion.").
123. See Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 405 (rejecting use of Lemon and
coercive effect tests in favor of test that asks whether governmental practice ap-
pears to endorse religion). In Pinette, Justice O'Connor explained that "[w]hen
the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion, I
believe it is our duty to hold the practice invalid." See Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, Justice O'Connor set out what she
believed to be the crucial inquiry in Establishment Clause cases, namely that the
governmental practice does not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
125. See id. at 683-84.
126. See id. (ordering school to remove portrait of Jesus).
127. See id at 684-85 (Guy, J., concurring) (noting agreement with majority
that school violated Establishment Clause by hanging portrait of Jesus in school
hallway, but hoping that people would keep matters like this out of court and have
more resiliency in these types of cases).
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It is also necessary examine how courts view classroom behav-
ior in an Establishment Clause context.128 Courts often focus on
the nature of the religious material in the classroom, paying partic-
ular attention to how and what role the religious material plays in
classroom instruction. 129 Courts allow schools to exercise their dis-
cretion in determining classroom materials and whether particular
conduct endorses religion.130 Educators must maintain a delicate
balance of directing learning, while still maintaining students' free
speech and free exercise rights in the classroom. 31
In Edwards v. Aguillard,13 2 the Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether the Louisiana Creationism Act violated the Establish-
ment Clause. 133 The act prohibited the teaching of evolution in
public schools unless it was accompanied by the teaching of crea-
tionism.134 The Court found the act to be unconstitutional because
it failed the first prong of the Lemon test, namely that the act had a
religious purpose.'3 5 The state alleged that in fact the act was an
attempt to protect academic freedom, however, the Court found
that the act diminished "academic freedom by removing the flexi-
bility to teach evolution without also teaching creation science."' 36
While in Edwards, the Court dealt with an actual state statute,
courts have distinguished between purely private religious speech
by students and speech that acts as a government endorsement of a
particular practice or religion.137 Courts, however, draw a line as to
the role a teacher's speech plays because teachers do not have a
128. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759 (equating studio theater where Corpus
Christi performed with public school classroom).
129. See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
classrooms not public forums); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055 (10th Cir.
1990) (noting Establishment Clause inquiries in classroom focus on manner of use
of materials at issue).
130. See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055 (stating use of books on American Indian
religion could violate Establishment Clause if books were taught in proselytizing
manner, but do not necessarily violate Establishment Clause when viewed only for
content).
131. See Mawdsley & Russo, supra note 20, at 14 (stating school officials must
maintain balance to safeguard free speech rights of students and maintain their
right to be free to direct learning).
132. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
133. See id. at 580-81 (setting out issue that was presented).
134. See id. at 581 (setting forth what Creationism Act purported to accom-
plish).
135. See id. at 593 (stating real purpose of Creationism Act was to reform cur-
riculum to conform with particular religious viewpoint).
136. See id. at 586 n.6.
137. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 409 n.1 (5th Cir.
1995) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating students may read their Bi-
bles, say grace before meals and pray before tests, but schools cannot administer
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First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in their class-
room. 138 The school board, however, is often given broader au-
thority to determine what should and should not be classroom
material.13 9 Many of these cases turn on whether the school board
has satisfied the Establishment Clause inquiry as set out in Lemon,
but others utilize the endorsement or coercive test.140
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
In Linnemeir, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district
court and held that the university theater was a non-public fo-
rum.' 4 ' The majority, however, came to the same conclusion as the
district court in that the play could go on as scheduled. 42 In com-
ing to its conclusion, the majority first looked at the subject matter
of the play itself and conceded that the play was blasphemous. 143
The court, however, gave complete deference to school and univer-
sity authorities to determine whether classroom instruction should
include the works of such blasphemers.' 44 If the court had found
that the university violated the Establishment Clause, the majority
stated such a finding would have a profound effect on university
curricula.' 45 The majority made the distinction that if the state uni-
versity had a policy of promoting these anti-Christian beliefs, the
school would have violated the Establishment Clause. 146 Here,
such rules to prevent students from doing this because to do so would violate stu-
dents' First Amendment rights).
138. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (con-
cluding public university professor does not have First Amendment right to decide
what will be taught in his classroom).
139. See id. at 492 (stating university acted as speaker and was entitled to make
content-based choices regarding professor's syllabus).
140. For a further discussion of the three Establishment Clause tests, see supra
notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
141. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (holding university theater is classroom
which is not public forum); see also id. at 761 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating evi-
dence proposing studio theater as limited public forum was "hallow").
142. See id. at 760 (denying plaintiffs' motion to stay pending appeal and al-
lowing play to proceed as scheduled).
143. See id. at 758 (noting "[t]he play is indeed blasphemous.., most believ-
ing Christians will be shocked and offended").
144. See id. at 760 ("The school authorities and the teachers, not the courts,
decide whether classroom instruction shall include works by blasphemers.").
145. See id. at 758 (finding if university was prohibited from providing venue
for expression of antagonistic Christian beliefs, then works of Voltaire, Hobbes,
Marx, Freud, Mill, Sartre and others could not be taught).
146. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989) ("A
secular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an atheistic or antire-
ligious state. A secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its official
21
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however, the court did not find that the school had such a policy. 147
First, the court focused on the fact that it was a student, Jonathan
Gilbert, and not the school theater department, who selected the
play.148 Second, the majority stated that there was no evidence that
if the play attacked a different religion other than Christianity, that
the university would have prevented that play from being per-
formed. 149 Finally, the majority stated that the university went to
great lengths to disclaim any perceived endorsement of the play's
message "by publicly disclaiming that by exhibiting Corpus Christi it
is allying itself with the enemies of Christianity."150
B. The Dissent
Judge Coffey, in his dissent, believed that if Corpus Christi was to
be performed at the studio theater, the court would "with a wink
and a nod, tolerate government sponsored attacks on religion. 151
Despite its different holding, the dissent agreed with the majority
that the university theater was not a public forum. 15 2 "But the ju-
rists parted ways after that."153 The dissent first questioned the evi-
dence that the trial judge relied on in his decision that the studio
theater was a limited public forum.154 Because the dissent also be-
creed."); see also Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759 (stating public university with policy of
promoting atheism, Satanism, secular humanism, Unitarianism or Buddhism
would violate Establishment Clause).
147. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759 (holding no evidence presented that uni-
versity was hostile towards Christianity and that it was student's own idea to direct
this play).
148. See id. (stating no faculty or university member told student to put on
production, rather it was his own idea).
149. See id. (stating plaintiffs produced no evidence that university authorities
would have prevented play attacking some other religion). This lack of evidence is
significant because it undercuts the dissenter's theory that the school was engaged
in viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 767 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 760.
151. See id. at 760 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Judge Coffey believed that by al-
lowing the play to go on, it would allow further anti-religious speech or attacks on
religion to flourish and flood forums where any religion could be the next target
sanctioned by the government. See id.
152. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 763-74 (CoffeyJ., dissenting) (questioning evi-
dence district judge relied on in determining studio theater was limited public
forum).
153. Manson, supra note 45.
154. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 762-63 (Coffey, J., dissenting). First, the dissent
did not believe that the two statements made by the chancellor and the theater
department head were enough to establish a limited public forum. See id. at 763.
Furthermore, the dissent questioned whether the theater was actually even availa-
ble to the entire student body, let alone the outside community by illustrating that
only three students out of the entire student body would be staging productions in
the studio theater this year. See id.
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lieved the studio theater was a non-public forum, it believed that
the government, and not the individual, was the speaker. 155 Be-
cause the dissent believed that the university was the speaker, it
then underwent the three-prong Lemon analysis to determine
whether the university practice of allowing the play to go forward
was a constitutional violation. 156 Using this analysis, the dissent ulti-
mately concluded that the University's tacit sponsorship of Corpus
Christi violated the First Amendment. 157
Next, the dissent attacked the grounds of academic freedom
which the majority utilized in reaching its conclusion. 158 While
Judge Coffey supported wide protection for academic freedom, he
decided that this academic freedom argument could not override
the religious rights of those protected under the Establishment
Clause. 159 Furthermore, he distinguished the works of Darwin and
Marx, which the majority compared to Corpus Christi, by explaining
that Darwin and Marx are only incompatible with Christian beliefs,
whereas Corpus Christi is an outright disparagement and mockery of
fundamental Christian beliefs.1 60 Finally, the dissent concluded
that even if the Studio Theater was classified as a limited public
forum, he would still grant the stay because the school might be
engaged in viewpoint discrimination. 161
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Corpus Christi was a
blasphemous play. 162 Blasphemy is defined as "[i]rreverence to-
155. See id. at 764 ("My conclusion is that in this case it is the government, and
not the private individual, that is doing the speaking.").
156. See id. (discussing Lemon three-prong test).
157. See id. at 765 (stating disapproval of Christianity in this case may send
message to adherents of Christian faith that they are not full members of political
community (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))).
158. See id. (stressing while academic freedom plays vital role on college cam-
puses, academic freedom has limits and universities must respect Constitutional
religious rights).
159. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 766 ("I want to make clear that [academic free-
dom] has limits and universities must respect the religious rights of all protected in
the First Amendment."). The dissent believed that while there is wide protection
for academic freedom, courts have never held that universities lie entirely beyond
the reach of students' First Amendment rights. See id.
160. See id. (stating play itself can only be characterized as vulgar attack on
Christianity).
161. See id. at 767-68 (stating injunction should be granted because more evi-
dence is needed to show whether school is allowing anti-Christian speech to be
allowed while not allowing other anti-religious speech to be put forth).
162. See id. at 760.
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ward God, religion, a religious icon, or something considered sa-
cred.'1 63 The court, therefore, acknowledged that the play itself
was a front towards the Christian faith because it showed irrever-
ence towards something sacred, in this case, the life and death of
Jesus Christ.164 However, the court did not say that the play rose to
a level so as to violate the Establishment Clause. 165 Unlike previous
circuit court opinions that have used one of the three delineated
Establishment Clause tests in determining whether a specific class-
room activity violates the Establishment Clause, the majority in this
case never underwent an Establishment Clause analysis. 166 Instead,
the majority used academic freedom as its rationale for allowing the
public performance of Corpus Christi to go forward. 167 By neglect-
ing Establishment Clause analysis and responding only with an aca-
demic freedom rationale, the Seventh Circuit blurred future
Establishment Clause questions by permitting schools to support or
justify artistic expression without passing one of the three Establish-
ment Clause tests. 168 Schools can now argue that under academic
freedom, school officials are the ultimate authority as to whether
the action should or should not go forward. 169 By relying on aca-
demic freedom rather than conducting an Establishment Clause in-
quiry, the Seventh Circuit majority decided the case without the
analysis other courts have deemed proper in determining whether
artistic, entertainment or an academic curricula item violates the
Establishment Clause.17 0 While courts have often used an academic
163. BLACK'S LAW DicriONARY 164 (7th ed. 1999).
164. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 758 (stating most Christians will be shocked
and offended by dialogue and premise of play).
165. See id. at 759.
166. See, e.g., Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir.
1995) (undergoing endorsement test analysis to see whether public performance
of religious theme song by public school choir violated Establishment Clause);
Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) (undergo-
ing Lemon analysis to determine whether piece of artwork depicting Jesus Christ
displayed for all in school hallway violated Establishment Clause); Brown v. Wood-
land Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994) (undergoing
Lemon three part analysis to determine whether inclusion of Impressions series vio-
lated Establishment Clause); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534
(9th Cir. 1985) (going through Lemon three part analysis to see if inclusion of The
Learning Tree in curriculum violated Establishment Clause).
167. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (stating school authorities should properly
decide what works of blasphemers should be included in classroom instruction).
168. See id. ("Academic freedom, and states' rights, alike demand deference
to educational judgments that are not invidious.").
169. See id. (stating this "is a matter for the state university, not for federal
judges, to determine").
170. See id. (offering academic freedom as rationale to defer to University
judgment). This is not to say that the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided the case
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freedom argument to supplement the Establishment Clause in-
quiry, most courts have also undergone an Establishment Clause
analysis as well to supplement their holding.171 The method of
analysis the court used in this case, however, gives school officials
broader range to decide their own curriculum. This holding
changes future litigation because under this ruling, artistic expres-
sion and entertainment related activities can now possibly sidestep
the traditional tests and utilize the academic freedom rationale only
in supporting their action. Had the majority utilized both aca-
demic freedom and an accompanying Establishment Clause test, it
would have followed previous court opinions and provided the ad-
ditional hurdle that schools need to overcome in Establishment
Clause cases. 172 After this case, therefore, the line of where aca-
demic freedom ends and Establishment Clause begins is blurred.173
The dissenting judge used the Lemon test to dismiss the major-
ity's academic freedom argument, yet his ultimate conclusion that
the play failed to satisfy the Lemon analysis was incorrect. 174 The
dissent focused on the purpose of the governmental conduct in this
case. 175 The purpose prong of the Lemon test however, asks
whether the government intended to convey a message of endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion. a76 As the dissent correctly stated,
the First Amendment seeks to protect neutrality towards religion.' 77
The dissenter, however, failed to acknowledge the steps the univer-
incorrectly, only that its ultimate decision lacked the analysis that other courts have
utilized in similar Establishment Clause inquiries. For a discussion of courts using
the varying Establishment Clause tests to determine an alleged Establishment
Clause violation, see supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
171. Compare Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 1998)
(undergoing no Lemon analysis but stressing that academic freedom and First
Amendment compel conclusion that professor does not have constitutional right
to choose curriculum in contravention of University's dictates), with Duncanville
Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d at 402 (undergoing endorsement test analysis but stating
that if court removed all religious music from choir's repertoire, it would eliminate
seventy-five percent of choral music).
172. For a discussion of court decisions using Establishment Clause analysis in
the public school curriculum context, see supra notes 56-77, 117-40 and accompa-
nying text.
173. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (stating cases like this should be left to
school officials to decide rather than courts).
174. See id. at 765-66 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (attempting to show production
of play does not satisfy Lemon test).
175. See id. at 765 (stating first prong of Lemon test focuses on purpose of
governmental conduct).
176. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connnor, J.,
concurring).
177. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 765 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("Both endorse-
ment and disapproval are prohibited in light of the preeminent goal of the First
Amendment to promote government 'neutrality' toward religion.").
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sity took to remain neutral by not engaging in content discrimina-
tion and by disclaiming any possible endorsement.17 8 The purpose
of the state action in this case was to allow students to direct theater
productions of their own choosing, irrespective of their viewpoint,
therefore, it was quite different than the state action in Edwards in
which the state's purpose was to undermine teaching scientific
evolution and conform curriculum to religious theory of creation-
ism. 1 79 Furthermore, the production of Corpus Christi was part of
the larger curriculum of the university theater season because it was
to be performed in association with other entertainment produc-
tions that in no way presented Establishment Clause issues. °80 This
court should have reasoned that because Corpus Christi was part of a
larger curriculum of public entertainment, as The Learning Tree was
part of a larger literary curriculum in Grove, it therefore should not
have violated the Establishment Clause. 181
While the majority opinion did not engage in an Establishment
Clause analysis in determining whether this entertainment related
activity violated the First Amendment, all three justices came to the
correct judgment in overruling the district court's assessment that
178. See id. at 759-60 (stating university included disclaimer in playbill and
had "been scrupulous in disclaiming that by exhibiting Corpus Christi it is allying
itself with the enemies of Christianity"); see also Capitol Square Review and Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995) (plurality opinion) (stating that if
state is concerned about possible misconceptions public may have about cross, it
can require all displays to be identified as private displays via disclaimer). For a
factual overview of the University's selection process, see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text; Daniel Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 253, 289 (1994) (stating that allowing displays in public forums with ade-
quate disclaimers strike adequate balance between eliminating all religious dis-
plays in public forums altogether with giving religious displays free run in public
forums).
179. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (stating purpose of Creation-
ism Act was to conform curriculum into particular religious viewpoint).
180. See Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Fort Wayne, 155 F. Supp. 2d
1034, 1037 (N.D. Ind. 2001), stay denied sub nom., Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Pur-
due Univ., 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating production of Corpus Christi was
one of nine plays to be performed during theater season and that all were chosen
without regard to viewpoint).
181. See, e.g., Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1381
(9th Cir. 1994) (reasoning because challenged selections constitute only minute
part of entire Impressions curriculum, ensures that objective observer will find no
Establishment Clause violation); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1541
(9th Cir. 1985) (Canby, J., concurring) (stating "the issue however, is not whether
the work disapproves of any particular religious vision, but whether such inclusion
in the public school curriculum indicates, intentionally or not, that the govern-
ment joins in that disapproval"); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (setting out endorsement test by stating that "Every government prac-
tice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it consti-
tutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
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the studio theater represented a limited public forum. 18 2 The
court was correct in determining that the theater itself was a non-
public forum.18 3 As the majority stated, both parties and the dis-
trict judge spent "a lot of time debating whether the university's
theater is really a public forum."'1 4 The Seventh Circuit ultimately
decided correctly on the public forum issue, especially when con-
sidering the two factors used in deciding whether the state has
formed a limited public forum. 18 5 Courts have looked to govern-
mental intent and more importantly to the extent of use of the area
at issue to help illustrate whether the state created a limited public
forum.'8 6 The school could only point to one group outside of the
university's own theater department who had used the theater in
the last thirty years.18 7 Second, the university did not have a written
policy but only the testimony of two administrators as to whether
the theater was in fact opened to all.' 88 The testimony of the ad-
ministrators was, as the dissenting judge claimed, "hallow." 18 9
These two facts taken together solidified the position that the thea-
ter was a non-public forum. 190 Because the school did not satisfy
182. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (holding studio theater to be a classroom
and therefore non-public forum).
183. See id.
184. Id. at 759-60.
185. See Frels, supra note 86, at 243 (stating two factors courts look at in deter-
mining whether state has created limited public forum are government intent and
extent of use).
186. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000) (reason-
ing school did not necessarily form limited public forum for simple fact that only
one student was granted access to stage); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 235 (1990) ('A limited forum exists whenever a public secondary school
grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more non-curriculum related stu-
dent groups to meet on school premises during non-instructional time."); see also
Frels, supra note 86, at 243.
187. See Linnemeier v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Fort Wayne, 155 F. Supp. 2d
1034, 1037 (N.D. Ind. 2001), stay denied sub nom., Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Pur-
due Univ., 260 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating only one high school drama group
outside of university's general theater season had used studio theater in past thirty
years).
188. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 761 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating school had
no formal written policy discussing forum but only had testimony of two university
administrators stating they opened up theater to all groups).
189. See id. (stating administrators produced no evidentiary support in addi-
tion to their self-serving testimony).
190. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 53
(1983) (stating where government property is not dedicated to open communica-
tion, government can restrict access). See generally Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108,
1117 (3d Cir. 1992) (ruling state creates limited public forum by deliberately open-
ing area up to public as long as it maintains such an open forum, and that govern-
ment does not create limited public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse).
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the extent of the use requirement and failed to support it with any
tangible governmental intent in the form of a written policy, the
theater was correctly ruled a non-public forum. 19 1
VI. IMPACT
The impact of this case is twofold. First, this case has blurred
the line between the Establishment Clause and academic freedom
by using only an academic freedom analysis to support its hold-
ing.192 Because the court did not utilize one of the three Establish-
ment Clause tests set out by the Supreme Court, it gives public
schools and universities greater autonomy to decide for themselves
what should or should not be in the curriculum. 193 This could have
future implications on such activities like choir, theater or art clas-
ses that represent artistic expression or entertainment perform-
ances in the academic setting.194 Not only are plays given freer
reign because of this academic freedom ruling, but other forms of
art and entertainment are given wider latitude as well. 195 This case
solidifies other court decisions that have stated schools should be
given the authority to decide their own curriculum, however, this
case fails to supplement its holding with the additional hurdle of an
Establishment Clause inquiry that other courts have used.196 Now,
under the theory of academic freedom, the state can release itself
from possible Establishment Clause inquiries in areas of artistic ex-
pression and entertainment even if the area is not opened to the
191. For a discussion of the proper analysis in determining a limited public
forum, see supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
192. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (ruling academic freedom demands defer-
ence to state university to decide this matter).
193. See id. at 760 (giving deference to schools and school officials to decide
these matters, not courts).
194. See id. (stating university is proper decision maker in this case, not judici-
ary). But see Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1995)
(using endorsement test to conclude singing religious theme song at concerts did
not violate Establishment Clause because it neither advances nor endorses relig-
ion). While Linneneir gives deference to the state university in these cases of en-
tertainment related curriculum items, the court in Duncanville underwent
Establishment Clause judicial inquiry to approve the school's practice. See id.
195. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (holding theater like classroom and there-
fore academic freedom allows production to go forward). But see Washegesic v.
Bloomingdale Sch. Dist., 33 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting portrait not part
of group of paintings nor is it in conjunction with any class or educational
program).
196. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1055 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
'school officials must be allowed, within certain bounds, to exercise discretion in
determining what materials or classroom practices are being used appropriately");
see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Local
school boards have broad discretion in the management of schools.").
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public. 197 One way of accomplishing this result would be as the
court did here, to allow school officials and administrators rather
than the courts to decide whether to allow certain religious, or anti-
religious material from going forward.1 98 Certainly, some Establish-
ment Clause analysis is still necessary in many cases, however, Lin-
nemeir opens the question as to where academic freedom ends and
Establishment Clause inquiry begins. This determination can be
particularly significant where there is entertainment or artistic ex-
pression open to the public that is performed as part of a student's
academic credit. 199
The second major impact of this case relates to the public fo-
rum doctrine.200 This case has solidified and impacted the public
forum doctrine by placing definite limits on when a party can suc-
cessfully argue that the state has created a limited public forum. 20 1
Such limitations will have profound effects on artistic expression
and entertainment related activities in public schools because it will
be harder for public schools to separate themselves from the artistic
expression or entertainment related activity.20 2 No longer can the
state or party seeking to establish a limited public forum merely rely
on the statements of officials in stating that the forum is open to
the public.20 3 Rather, either the party seeking to establish a limited
public forum must show either that the state has opened the forum
to a number of groups thereby creating a limited public forum, or
that the state has adopted such policy into writing.20 4 This require-
197. But see Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating academic freedom argument limited to school district or university admin-
istration and does not extend to professors).
198. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760.
199. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's Establishment Clause analysis in a
similar case, see supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
200. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see supra notes 82-116 and
accompanying text.
201. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (holding studio theater is classroom and
therefore non-public forum and rejecting university administrators claims they
opened up theater to public and created limited public forum).
202. See supra note 113.
203. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 761 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (stating court will
not rely on hallow statements of government officials to establish limited public
forum). It is important to note that both the dissent and the majority agreed on
the fact that the theater was a non-public forum, with the majority comparing the
theater to a classroom and the dissent rejecting the administrators' statements. See
supra notes 141, 154 and accompanying text. Either way, all three justices were in
agreement that the administrator's statements coupled with the one time use of
the theater by an outside group did not constitute enough to create a limited pub-
lic forum. See supra notes 141, 154 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 4312 at *16 (June 11, 2001) (stating parties stipulation that after school
29
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ment will affect many artistic and entertainment related activities
that occur in public schools outside of the classroom. 20 5 Because
the court unequivocally held the university theater to be a non-pub-
lic forum, for the state to separate itself from the "religious" en-
tertainment or expressive activity, it cannot successfully argue that
the activity was purely private in a limited public forum without the
show of evidence that either outside groups using the space or the
school had a formal open policy.20 6 A party therefore, must
demonstrate either evidence showing that many groups have uti-
lized the forum thereby creating a limited public forum, or prove
that the state has adopted language creating a limited public forum
into writing. Without either of these being demonstrated to the
court, it appears that the forum will remain a non-public forum,
and therefore eliminate the state's possible defense that the artistic
expression or entertainment related activity was purely private in a
limited public forum, and that they adequately disclaimed any per-
ceived endorsement. 20 7 This result could impact expressive and en-
tertainment activities at universities and public schools primarily
because without either a past history or a formal school policy, a
non-public forum will be in place, which will mean the university
can reasonably regulate an individual's speech.20 While in this
case, the university supported the student's selection of the play,
perhaps next time, based on non-public forum grounds, the univer-
sity might allege they have the right to reasonably regulate the non-
public area to prevent the artistic expression from going forward.
Universities can look to this case on two separate fronts as it
relates to art and entertainment on their campuses that raise Estab-
lishment Clause questions. One the one hand, if the artistic expres-
facilities were limited public forum because many other after school clubs used
facilities); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990) ("A limited forum
exists whenever a public secondary school grants an offering to or opportunity for
one or more non-curriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during non-instructional time.").
205. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 759-60 (recognizing important distinction that
because court held that theater was classroom, school was entitled to academic
freedom). The court, however, said nothing as to what analysis would be appropri-
ate if the play was not being performed for academic credit.
206. By holding that the theater was in fact a non-public forum, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the statements of school administrators that the studio theater was
open for outside use, although only one outside group in the last thirty years had
taken advantage of this opportunity. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 761 (Coffey, J., dis-
senting). Thereby, the court in effect held that mere assertions of an opening by a
school to establish a limited public forum are insufficient. See id. at 762.
207. See supra note 113.
208. See Ansson, Jr., supra note 85, at 5 (stating government can reasonably
regulate speech in non-public forums).
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sion or entertainment comes solely from a student as part of a class,
the school seems to be safe from violating the Establishment Clause
based on a school's ability to decide its curriculum. 209 On the other
hand, as it relates to artistic expression and entertainment related
activities that occur on public school grounds, the state or party
supporting the activity will be unsuccessful in arguing that the activ-
ity takes place in a public forum unless the party can show a pattern
or practice that the school opened the forum up to public use. 210
While the court allowed schools greater autonomy when it comes to
artistic expression and entertainment related activities, the court
perhaps curtailed the school from arguing that the "religious" en-
tertainment activity took place in a limited public forum. While in
this case the school supported Jonathan's Gilbert's production of
Corpus Christi, perhaps the next school will not. In this hypothetical
case however, the school will be free from any alleged violation of a
student's free speech because it will be in a non-public forum which
will give the school the opportunity to reasonably regulate the area.
Drew Whelan
209. See Linnemeir, 260 F.3d at 760 (stating academic freedom demands defer-
ence to education judgment by schools that are not invidious).
210. See id. at 759.
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